SSL_CTX_set_options(3)              OpenSSL             SSL_CTX_set_options(3)

       SSL_CTX_set_options, SSL_set_options, SSL_CTX_get_options,
       SSL_get_options - manipulate SSL engine options

        #include <openssl/ssl.h>

        long SSL_CTX_set_options(SSL_CTX *ctx, long options);
        long SSL_set_options(SSL *ssl, long options);

        long SSL_CTX_get_options(SSL_CTX *ctx);
        long SSL_get_options(SSL *ssl);

       SSL_CTX_set_options() adds the options set via bitmask in options to
       ctx.  Options already set before are not cleared!

       SSL_set_options() adds the options set via bitmask in options to ssl.
       Options already set before are not cleared!

       SSL_CTX_get_options() returns the options set for ctx.

       SSL_get_options() returns the options set for ssl.

       The behaviour of the SSL library can be changed by setting several
       options.  The options are coded as bitmasks and can be combined by a
       logical or operation (|). Options can only be added but can never be

       SSL_CTX_set_options() and SSL_set_options() affect the (external) pro-
       tocol behaviour of the SSL library. The (internal) behaviour of the API
       can be changed by using the similar SSL_CTX_set_mode(3) and
       SSL_set_mode() functions.

       During a handshake, the option settings of the SSL object are used.
       When a new SSL object is created from a context using SSL_new(), the
       current option setting is copied. Changes to ctx do not affect already
       created SSL objects. SSL_clear() does not affect the settings.

       The following bug workaround options are available:

  - when talking SSLv2, if session-id reuse is per-
           formed, the session-id passed back in the server-finished message
           is different from the one decided upon.

           Netscape-Commerce/1.12, when talking SSLv2, accepts a 32 byte chal-
           lenge but then appears to only use 16 bytes when generating the
           encryption keys.  Using 16 bytes is ok but it should be ok to use
           32.  According to the SSLv3 spec, one should use 32 bytes for the
           challenge when operating in SSLv2/v3 compatibility mode, but as
           mentioned above, this breaks this server so 16 bytes is the way to

 , first a connection is established with
           RC4-MD5.  If it is then resumed, we end up using DES-CBC3-SHA.  It
           should be RC4-MD5 according to, 'cipher_suite'.

           Netscape-Enterprise/2.01 ( has this
           bug.  It only really shows up when connecting via SSLv2/v3 then
           reconnecting via SSLv3. The cipher list changes....

           NEW INFORMATION.  Try connecting with a cipher list of just
           DES-CBC-SHA:RC4-MD5.  For some weird reason, each new connection
           uses RC4-MD5, but a re-connect tries to use DES-CBC-SHA.  So
           netscape, when doing a re-connect, always takes the first cipher in
           the cipher list.



           This option has no effect now.




           Disables a countermeasure against a SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 protocol vul-
           nerability affecting CBC ciphers, which cannot be handled by some
           broken SSL implementations.  This option has no effect for connec-
           tions using other ciphers.

           All of the above bug workarounds.

       It is usually safe to use SSL_OP_ALL to enable the bug workaround
       options if compatibility with somewhat broken implementations is

       The following modifying options are available:

           Disable version rollback attack detection.

           During the client key exchange, the client must send the same
           information about acceptable SSL/TLS protocol levels as during the
           first hello. Some clients violate this rule by adapting to the
           server's answer. (Example: the client sends a SSLv2 hello and
           accepts up to SSLv3.1=TLSv1, the server only understands up to
           SSLv3. In this case the client must still use the same
           SSLv3.1=TLSv1 announcement. Some clients step down to SSLv3 with
           respect to the server's answer and violate the version rollback

           Always create a new key when using temporary/ephemeral DH parame-
           ters (see SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(3)).  This option must be
           used to prevent small subgroup attacks, when the DH parameters were
           not generated using "strong" primes (e.g. when using DSA-parame-
           ters, see dhparam(1)).  If "strong" primes were used, it is not
           strictly necessary to generate a new DH key during each handshake
           but it is also recommended.  SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE should therefore
           be enabled whenever temporary/ephemeral DH parameters are used.

           Always use ephemeral (temporary) RSA key when doing RSA operations
           (see SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(3)).  According to the
           specifications this is only done, when a RSA key can only be used
           for signature operations (namely under export ciphers with
           restricted RSA keylength). By setting this option, ephemeral RSA
           keys are always used. This option breaks compatibility with the
           SSL/TLS specifications and may lead to interoperability problems
           with clients and should therefore never be used. Ciphers with EDH
           (ephemeral Diffie-Hellman) key exchange should be used instead.

           When choosing a cipher, use the server's preferences instead of the
           client preferences. When not set, the SSL server will always follow
           the clients preferences. When set, the SSLv3/TLSv1 server will
           choose following its own preferences. Because of the different pro-
           tocol, for SSLv2 the server will send his list of preferences to
           the client and the client chooses.



           If we accept a netscape connection, demand a client cert, have a
           non-self-sighed CA which does not have it's CA in netscape, and the
           browser has a cert, it will crash/hang.  Works for 3.x and 4.xbeta


           Do not use the SSLv2 protocol.

           Do not use the SSLv3 protocol.

           Do not use the TLSv1 protocol.

           When performing renegotiation as a server, always start a new ses-
           sion (i.e., session resumption requests are only accepted in the
           initial handshake).  This option is not needed for clients.

       SSL_CTX_set_options() and SSL_set_options() return the new options bit-
       mask after adding options.

       SSL_CTX_get_options() and SSL_get_options() return the current bitmask.

       ssl(3), SSL_new(3), SSL_clear(3), SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(3),
       SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(3), dhparam(1)

       TION_ON_RENEGOTIATION have been added in OpenSSL 0.9.7.

       SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG has been added in OpenSSL 0.9.6 and was auto-
       matically enabled with SSL_OP_ALL. As of 0.9.7, it is no longer
       included in SSL_OP_ALL and must be explicitly set.

       SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS has been added in OpenSSL 0.9.6e.
       Versions up to OpenSSL 0.9.6c do not include the countermeasure that
       can be disabled with this option (in OpenSSL 0.9.6d, it was always

0.9.7a                            2005-10-27            SSL_CTX_set_options(3)